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Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms,
and the Law: The Normative Impact of
Product Configuration Bans
LINDSAY F. WILEY
What role should government play in discouraging harmful
overconsumption? What modes of government intervention best strike the
balance between effectiveness and political acceptability? It is well
established that government has a legitimate interest in protecting the
health and safety of the people, even from their own choices and actions.
Furthermore, there is no fundamental right to sell or purchase particular
services or products in particular configurations. The appropriate
question, then, is not what government may do to prevent noncommunicable diseases that are associated with individual behavior
choices, but rather what government should do. This comment on David
Friedman’s Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism
focuses on Friedman’s insight that visibility is the key distinction between
paternalistic measures like the ban on artificial trans-saturated fats in
restaurant food—which have faced very little opposition in spite of
adopting a heavy-handed approach—and measures like the “Big Gulp
Ban” and the “Happy Meal Ordinance”—which are unpopular and have
been strongly opposed by industry in spite of intruding less upon individual
autonomy. While the high visibility of these regulations makes them less
politically palatable, visibility might also be key to their positive impact—
through their influence on social norms about appropriate portion size and
balanced meals for small children.
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Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms,
and the Law: The Normative Impact of
Product Configuration Bans
LINDSAY F. WILEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
What role should government play in discouraging harmful
overconsumption? What modes of government intervention best strike the
balance between effectiveness and political acceptability? In this Issue,
David Friedman fleshes out a useful typology to structure examination of
these pressing questions.1 His project is ambitious and important. I am
unconvinced, however, by his argument that “visible, hard paternalism”2 is
not a viable option as part of a “full-court press”3 to prevent obesity
because popular support for it is low and it is not practically effective.
Friedman articulates his argument in terms of political acceptability
and practical efficacy because it is difficult to tether anti-paternalism to
legal doctrine. It is, in fact, well established that government has a
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of the people, even
from their own choices and actions.4 In cases where a fundamental right or
suspect classification is implicated, a purely paternalistic governmental
interest may not be sufficiently compelling to justify infringement.5 But
*

Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
See David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN.
L. REV. 1687, 1698–99 (2014) (outlining five levels of interventional efforts).
2
Id. at 1692, 1767.
3
Id. at 1719–20.
4
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding the
constitutionality of an arrest and the jailing of a woman for failure to wear a seatbelt); Simon v.
Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 278–79 (D. Mass. 1972) (per curiam) (holding that a statute requiring
motorcyclists to wear protective headgear does not violate due process, notwithstanding the claim that
“police power does not extend to overcoming the right of an individual to incur risks that involve only
himself”), aff’d without opinion, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
5
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 n.12 (1996) (striking down a
regulation prohibiting advertisement of alcohol prices on First Amendment grounds, in part because
“[i]t is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on
speech would be more likely to achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance,” including taxation,
direct regulation establishing minimum prices or maximum per capita purchases, or education); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (striking
down a “highly paternalistic” regulation prohibiting pharmacists from advertising the prices of
prescription drugs, but noting that the state “is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes
of its pharmacists”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (rejecting sex discrimination
1
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there is no fundamental right to sell or purchase particular services or
products in particular configurations.6 Thus, Friedman’s argument is not
about what government may do to prevent non-communicable diseases and
injuries that are associated with individual behavior choices, but rather
what government should do. Adopting the same basic frame of inquiry, I
would like to focus on the visibility of the paternalism that Friedman
rejects, rather than on its hardness.
II. VISIBILITY AND SOCIAL NORMS
Friedman suggests that visibility is the key distinction between the ban
on artificial trans-saturated fats in restaurant food7—which has faced very
little opposition in spite of adopting a heavy-handed approach—and the
sugary drinks portion cap rule8—which was rejected by industry and the
“rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage”).
6
See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 697, 703–07 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that terminally ill adult patients had no
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause to have access to investigational drugs, after
surveying the long history of safety and efficacy regulation of drugs for personal use); Lange-Kessler v.
Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the right to privacy does not
encompass a woman’s right to choose a direct-entry midwife to assist during childbirth); see also
Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV. 737, 744 (2013) (concluding that there is no
constitutionally protected right to consume the foods of one’s choosing, based on “the long history of
curtailment of food choice, and the lack of any constitutional protection or tradition of broadly
protecting food rights”). “[T]he Court declared decades ago its ‘abandonment of the use of the ‘vague
contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to be
economically unwise.’” In re Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litig., 741 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963)) (citing Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1980) (noting that Lochner and similar cases are
“now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper”); Michael J. Phillips, Another
Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 265 (reviewing the historical
development and demise of enhanced constitutional protection of economic liberties under the
substantive due process doctrine, assessing proposals to revive it, and ultimately concluding that such a
revival would be inadvisable).
7
New York City’s Board of Health pioneered a ban on the use of artificial trans-saturated fats in
restaurant food in 2006. N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE § 81.08 (2014); N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.08) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY
HEALTH CODE 1, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hcart81-08.pdf. Similar bans were adopted by several other local and state governments in the years that
followed. See About Artificial Trans Fat, CENTER FOR SCI. PUB. INT., https://cspinet.org/transfat/about
.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (listing cities and states that have banned trans fats). The success of
restaurant-food trans fat bans inspired the FDA to announce in 2013 that it was taking action to
designate artificial trans fats as no longer “generally recognized as safe” for human consumption,
effectively banning their use in restaurant and packaged foods nationwide. Tentative Determination
Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils; Request for Comments and for Scientific Data and
Information, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,169, 67,169 (2013).
8
The New York City portion rule’s origins can be traced to a multi-agency obesity task force
created by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 2012. N.Y.C., REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC:
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public in spite of intruding less upon individual autonomy. It is certainly
true that customers are more aware of the size of the drinks they purchase
than the ingredients in their baked goods. If we had truly safe, affordable,
and appealing alternatives to sugar, salt, and fat, then a “stealth health”
approach might be possible for all food and beverage products. Regulators
could insist that healthier substitutes be used and consumers could go on
eating as much junk food as manufacturers could convince them to buy,
without paying the price in healthy years lost. But that is not the world live
in.
Given the limited reach of stealth health strategies, Friedman instead
THE NEW YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE PLAN TO PREVENT AND CONTROL OBESITY 2–3 (2012),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/otf_report.pdf. Among the Task Force’s twenty-six
recommendations for addressing the obesity crisis in New York City was a proposal to limit the size of
the containers food service enterprises use to sell sugary drinks. Id. at 14. The rule was incorporated
into the New York City Health Code. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, NOTICE OF
ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.53) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH
CODE 1 [hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION: PORTION CAP RULE], available at http://www.nyc.gov/htm
l/doh/downloads/pdf/notice/2012/notice-adoption-amend-article81.pdf. Its final language provided, “A
food service establishment may not sell, offer, or provide a sugary drink in a cup or container that is
able to contain more than 16 fluid ounces.” 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.53(3)(b) (2013). The rule defined a
sugary drink as one that: (1) is non-alcoholic; (2) is sweetened with a caloric sweetener; (3) contains
more than twenty five calories per eight fluid ounces; and (4) does not contain more than 50 percent of
milk or milk substitute. Id. § 81.53(1). The Board of Health emphasized that the choice of sixteen
ounces as the designated maximum portion size was intended to balance health impacts with the needs
of food establishments, as that size is both widely available at most regulated establishments and
familiar to customers. See Letter from Susan Kansagra, Assistant Comm’r, Bureau of Chronic Disease
Prevention & Tobacco Control, to the Members of the Bd. of Health and Thomas A. Farley, Chairman,
Bd. of Health (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/boh/article81response-to-comments.pdf (answering comments and concerns raised at the public hearing that
addressed the health impact of the regulation and the regulation’s feasibility for businesses).
9
Friedman’s thesis hinges on the unpopularity of the portion cap rule as the paradigm of visible
“hard paternalism.” See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1749 (noting that, unlike the portion cap rule, the
trans fat ban’s “tangible impact on consumers” is minimal). He discusses—and largely dismisses—
popular acceptance of two other Bloomberg-pioneered public health regulations: the trans fat ban,
discussed above, and a calorie-labeling mandate for chain restaurant menus. Bloomberg pioneered
calorie labeling in 2006. The measure was challenged by industry groups, see N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (striking down the initial version
of the N.Y.C. menu labeling requirement as preempted by the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act), and was eventually implemented in slightly modified form in 2008, 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.50. Several
other state and local governments quickly adopted similar mandates, and Congress made calorie
labeling mandatory nationwide through a provision of the Affordable Care Act passed in 2010, which
is still in the process of being implemented by the Food and Drug Administration. See 21 U.S.C. §
343(q)(5)(H) (2012) (requiring disclosing food nutritional contents for chain restaurants). Friedman
dismisses the calorie labeling measure because it is not “hard” and the trans fat ban because it is not
“visible.” See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1709, 1729–30 (analogizing the trans fat ban to “soft
paternalism” due to its “hidden” characteristics and categorizing calorie disclosures as “soft
paternalism”). Indeed, it is difficult to argue that the trans fat ban is any less hard in its paternalism
than the portion rule. It would seem to be significantly more so, given that the portion rule does
nothing to prohibit consumption of sugary drinks in whatever quantity a consumer desires, so long as
the purchase is configured in sixteen-ounce portions.
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argues for a visible, but non-regulatory, role for government. In addition
to “gently-induced free market voluntarism” (e.g., McDonald’s adding
sliced apples and cutting back on fries in Happy Meals10) and “hidden hard
paternalism”11 (e.g., the trans fat ban), Friedman praises educational efforts
(especially “strong-form debiasing” with an emphasis on storytelling) as
the best way to promote healthier eating and physical activity.12
A N.Y.C. Health Department advertisement depicting an overweight
man with his leg amputated below the knee and bearing the message
“portion sizes have grown: so has diabetes, which can lead to
amputations”13 would seem to be exactly what Friedman has in mind.
Other ads released as part of the City’s “Pouring on the Pounds” campaign
(launched a few years before the portion rule) depict two-liter bottles,
energy drink cans, and XXL fast food cups (sometimes standing alone,
sometimes being guzzled by actors) brimming with yellow globs of what
appears to be human fat.14 These messages—like anti-tobacco ads
emphasizing the cosmetic effects of smoking (stained teeth, wrinkled skin,
bad breath, etc.)15 or anti-formula-feeding ads depicting women putting
their babies at risk16—adopt a “social denormalization” strategy for
changing consumption.17
Friedman describes New York City’s healthy consumption education
campaign as a “fallback” strategy, indicating that the Mayor was backing
10
See Julie Jargon, Under Pressure, McDonald’s Adds Apples to Kids Meals, WALL ST. J., July
27, 2011, at B1 (describing the fast food chain’s decision as “the company’s latest move[] to fend off
more regulation of what kids eat” and linking it to a San Francisco ordinance prescribing minimum
nutritional requirements for meals that include toys or other incentive items aimed at children).
11
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1767–68.
12
Id. at 1734–37.
13
Patrick McGeehan, Blame Photoshop, Not Diabetes, for This Amputation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2012, at A22. Controversy over the advertisement’s use of digitally altered stock photos perhaps
reinforces Friedman’s preference for “truthful narratives.” See id. (reporting that Mayor Bloomberg’s
administration put an advertisement in circulation featuring a photo of an amputee, which was in fact
an altered stock image of a man who had both legs); see also Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698 (“[A]
truthful narrative of harm adds a degree of intervention beyond pure information about the presence of
[harm].”).
14
See Sewell Chan, New Targets in the Fat Fight: Soda and Juice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at
A22 (discussing the ad campaign and providing an example of a poster from it); see also Pouring on
the Pounds Ad Campaign Archive, N.Y.C. DEP’T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/living/sugarydrink-media-archive.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2014)
(featuring print and video advertisements released between 2009 and 2014).
15
See FDA Designs New Smoking Prevention Ad Strategy to Target Teens, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb.
4, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/fda-designs-smoking-prevention-strategy-target-teens/
(describing the launch of a new FDA ad campaign that targets teens by “playing into fears about the
superficial effects of smoking”).
16
See Roni Rabin, Breast-Feed or Else, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at F1 (describing
advertisements that compared failure to breast-feed to riding a mechanical bull while pregnant).
17
See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 121, 133 (2013).
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off of visible hard paternalism, but education and social marketing were
always an important part of the Bloomberg administration’s strategy. So
much so, that the portion rule is best understood as one component of a
broader effort to change social norms around over-consumption of sugary
drinks. The portion regulation’s visibility may have made it less politically
palatable, but visibility might also have been key to the regulation’s
positive impact—through its influence on social norms.
Friedman’s article misunderstands the use of law as a tool for
preventing obesity-related illness in a number of ways, but it suffers
particularly from his narrow view of the role of law in shaping social
norms. Health-related behaviors are “encased in a multitude of norms.”19
Public health advocates savvy to this connection have developed strategies
for combating positive, industry-promoted social norms around unhealthy
products (e.g., smoking is sexy and liberating; drinking Pepsi evinces a
carefree, “you only live once” attitude toward life)20 by promoting negative
counter-messages. On the flip side of the normativity coin, public health
strategies have also aimed to destigmatize certain statuses and behaviors in
an effort to more effectively address health risks. For example, public
health advocates have adopted a destigmatization strategy for HIV in an
effort to ensure that people get tested for the virus so that they can take
steps to protect themselves and others.
Denormalization and destigmatization strategies are perhaps most
transparent in social marketing campaigns—advertisements and
educational materials that go beyond straightforward information about
health risks to tap into powerful social norms.21 But law also plays an
important role in influencing social norms.22 Bans on smoking in
restaurants, workplaces, and even public parks and beaches mean that
fewer people—kids in particular—see smoking as a normal, everyday
activity going on around them. Regulations giving nursing mothers the
right to feed their infants anywhere that they have a legal right to be
present23 make life easier for breastfeeding families while also promoting
18

Friedman, supra note 1, at 1732.
W.A. BOGART, PERMIT BUT DISCOURAGE: REGULATING EXCESSIVE CONSUMPTION 91 (2011).
20
See Katrina Radic, “Live for Now”—Pepsi’s First Ever Global Campaign, BRANDING MAG.
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.brandingmagazine.com/2012/05/01/live-for-now-pepsis-first-globalcampaign/ (describing Pepsi’s advertisement campaign encouraging consumers to “live to the fullest”).
21
See Sonya Grier & Carol A. Bryant, Social Marketing in Public Health, 26 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 319, 319–20 (2005) (“Social marketing [is] the use of marketing to design and implement
programs to promote socially beneficial behavior change . . . .”).
22
There is a rich body of legal literature on the complex interaction between law and social
norms. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation
of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 349 (1997).
23
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-27-2001 (2013) (“A woman may breastfeed a child in a public
place or any place where other individuals are present.”).
19
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breastfeeding as a normal activity that need not be hidden from view.
III. DENORMALIZATION AND OBESITY
Applying these strategies to obesity, diabetes, and heart disease
prevention presents significant challenges. Recent proposals to ramp up a
social denormalization strategy for obesity have generated considerable
interest and controversy.24
These proposals have focused almost
exclusively on denormalizing fatness itself, rather than unhealthy products
or overconsumption of them. I have argued elsewhere that stigmatizing fat
people as a public health strategy—politically palatable though it may be—
is wrong-headed and counterproductive.25 An individual’s size says far
less about their eating habits or physical activity than people typically
assume.26 Thin people may engage in—and be harmed by—unhealthy
overconsumption. And large people may be physically fit and healthy.27
Rather than motivating healthy behaviors, body shaming is associated with
poorer self-care and poorer health.28
The goal should be to denormalize unhealthy products and
consumption patterns and re-normalize reasonable portion sizes and
balanced eating for everyone, without singling out particular people for
stigmatization based on their size or shape. But that is a difficult line to
walk, especially given the widespread stigmatization of fatness that exists
independent of any public health strategy to promote it.29
Denormalizing overconsumption of unhealthy food and beverage
24
See M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1337,
1351 (2005); Daniel Callahan, Obesity: Chasing an Elusive Epidemic, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34, 36
(2013).
25
Wiley, supra note 17.
26
Christian S. Crandall, Prejudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 882, 883 (1994) (noting that studies examining the hypothesis that
obesity is primarily caused by overeating have found that, on average, obese subjects consume the
same amount or less than normal weight subjects); I-Min Lee et al., Physical Activity and Coronary
Heart Disease in Women, 285 JAMA 1447, 1450 tbl.1 (2001) (indicating that the average weight
difference between the most sedentary and the most active study participants was about 1.5 BMI units).
27
See M. Fogelholm, Physical Activity, Fitness and Fatness: Relations to Mortality, Morbidity
and Disease Risk Factors: A Systematic Review, 11 OBESITY REVS. 202, 219 (2009) (“[T]he risk for
all-cause and cardiovascular mortality was lower in individuals with high BMI and good aerobic
fitness, compared with individuals with normal BMI and poor fitness.”).
28
See generally Craig A. Johnston et al., The Application of the Yerkes-Dodson Law in a
Childhood Weight Management Program: Examining Weight Dissatisfaction, 37 J. PEDIATRIC
PSYCHOL. 674 (2012); Rebecca M. Puhl et al., Internalization of Weight Bias: Implications for Binge
Eating and Emotional Well-Being, 15 OBESITY 19 (2007); K.R. Sonneville et al., Body Satisfaction,
Weight Gain and Binge Eating Among Overweight Adolescent Girls, 36 INT’L J. OBESITY 944 (2012).
29
Notably, New York City’s “Pouring on the Pounds” campaign has evolved over time to place
less emphasis on weight and more emphasis on health. The 2009 ads reference obesity, fatness, and
pounds (e.g., “Don’t Drink Yourself Fat”), whereas ads from 2013 place more emphasis on diabetes
and heart disease. See Pouring on the Pounds Ad Campaign Archive, supra note 14.
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products is far more complicated than denormalizing tobacco products.
Consumption of an unhealthy meal in a social setting might be highly
visible and therefore subject to the same kind of negative social norms that
have now attached to smoking a cigarette. But one meal says only so
much about a person’s lifestyle. Balanced eating is not a matter of a single
meal or a single food or beverage product. It involves complex patterns
over the course of days, weeks, and months. It can include enjoying
sugary, fatty, salty treats or splurging on a high-calorie meal from time to
time. Unfortunately, our current norms seem to endorse occasional treats
or splurges for some people, but not others. A thin person might consume
a large meal or a sugary treat without raising an eyebrow, while fat people
are regularly harassed at restaurants and grocery store checkout lines for
their food choices. Rather than promoting a culture of balanced
consumption for all, the effort to denormalize unhealthy overconsumption
easily degenerates into the same old stigmatization of particular people
based on their size.30
IV. CONFIGURATION BANS AS A TOOL FOR
DENORMALIZING UNHEALTHY OVERCONSUMPTION
Honing in on particular categories of products like sugary drinks and
kids meals is tempting because it reduces some of the complexity involved
in promoting healthy eating. Reducing consumption of sugary drinks is
not a comprehensive strategy for healthy eating, but it has been adopted by
many public health advocates as a reasonable starting point. The amount
of calories consumed from sugary drinks nearly tripled between 1977 and
2001.31 These drinks have been identified as the primary source of added
sugars in the American diet,32 and high consumption of them is associated
with an increased risk of type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and coronary heart
disease.33 It appears that sugary drinks may increase risk of type 2 diabetes
and cardiovascular disease independent of their impact on obesity, because
they contain high amounts of rapidly absorbable carbohydrates.34
30
In spite of the positive move toward health-focused rather than weight-focused ads in the
“Pouring on the Pounds” campaign, the ads get a lot of mileage out of their use of images of body fat,
which provoke reactions of disgust, blurring the lines between health risks and social costs associated
with norms about physical appearance.
31
Samara Joy Nielsen & Barry M. Popkin, Changes in Beverage Intake Between 1977 and 2001,
27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 205, 206 (2004).
32
See Gladys Block, Foods Contributing to Energy Intake in the US: Data from NHANES III and
NHANES 1999–2000, 17 J. FOOD COMPOSITION & ANALYSIS 439, 441 (2004).
33
See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Risk of Metabolic Syndrome and
Type 2 Diabetes: A Meta-Analysis, 33 DIABETES CARE 2477, 2481–82 (2010) (finding that there is a
significant link between the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages and type 2 diabetes and
metabolic syndrome, an illness that contributes to heart conditions).
34
See, e.g., Andrew O. Odegaard et al., Soft Drink and Juice Consumption and Risk of PhysicianDiagnosed Incident Type 2 Diabetes, 171 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 701, 706 (2010) (finding that the
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Essentially, overconsumption of sugary drinks is making a lot of people
sick, while also making some of them fat.
The profit margin on fountain drinks sold at fast food restaurants is
estimated to be around ninety percent35 and bonus pricing is ubiquitous. It
should come as no surprise then that the average portion size of sugary
drinks offered as fountain drinks in restaurants and in bottles packaged by
manufacturers has grown dramatically.36 The smaller portions that were
typical just a few decades ago now seem tiny. And the super-size portions
that seemed laughable are rapidly becoming the norm.
The portion cap rule is promising from a public health standpoint for
many reasons,37 including its potential to successfully “denormalize”
excessive portions.38 Just as bans on smoking in workplaces, restaurants,
and even wide-open public spaces have successfully denormalized
smoking as a socially accepted behavior by reducing our everyday
exposure to the sight of people smoking, the portion cap rule could
denormalize XXL cup sizes and “re-normalize” smaller portions that have
begun to look tiny by comparison. Like smoking in the sixties, the sight of
someone consuming a thirty-two—or even sixty-four—ounce cup of soda
has become quite routine. The portion cap rule (accompanied by other
public health interventions aimed at increasing disclosure of calorie
information on menu boards and raising awareness of the health risks
associated with overconsumption of sugary drinks) has potential to change
that. If the rule is ever implemented, smaller cups would become far more
visible in social settings and extra-large cups less so. As many critics have

association between sugary drinks and diabetes incidence was only partially mediated through body
mass index changes); Julie R. Palmer et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Incidence of Type 2
Diabetes Mellitus in African American Women, 168 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1487, 1490−91 (2008)
(finding that the association between sugar-sweetened sodas and diabetes incidence was mediated
through body mass index changes, while the association between sugar-sweetened fruit drinks and
diabetes incidence was not).
35
Paul Ziobro, McDonald’s Bets Pricing Drinks at $1 Will Heat Up Summer Sales, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18, 2010, at B6.
36
See Lisa R. Young & Marion Nestle, Portion Sizes and Obesity: Responses of Fast-Food
Companies, 28 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 238, 238−41 (2007) (finding significant increases in soft drink
sizes offered by such major fast food retailers as McDonald’s and Burger King).
37
Depending on how retailers respond to the regulation, the portion cap rule might also raise the
per-ounce price of sugary drinks, which research suggests would reduce consumption. The relationship
between price and consumption undergirds taxation strategies for sugary drinks, but none of the soda
taxes currently in effect in cities and states across the country rise to the level that research suggests
would be required to reduce consumption significantly. It is hard to know with any certainty how
retailers would respond to the portion cap rule, but it is unlikely that they would sell sixteen-ounce
portions at half the current price for thirty-two-ounce portions. If they attempt to stick somewhat close
to the current price point for a fountain soda, the per-ounce price could be significantly higher.
38
See NOTICE OF ADOPTION: PORTION CAP RULE, supra note 8 (stating that the rule will
“reacquaint[] New Yorkers with more appropriate portion sizes”).
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pointed out, the portion rule does nothing to stop a consumer from
drinking thirty-two, forty-eight, or sixty-four ounces in a sitting. But by
requiring that he do so by purchasing two, three, or four separate cups, the
measure sends a strong signal that he is consuming two, three, or four
times the socially appropriate amount.
Researchers and law and policy experts are working together to
identify similar strategies that extend beyond sugary drinks. Much of their
attention is focused on regulating the configuration of food and beverage
products that can be packaged and marketed as a “kids meal.” At least two
local governments—San Francisco and Santa Clara—pioneered the
adoption of healthy food incentive ordinances (better known as “Happy
Meal ordinances”) establishing minimal nutritional standards for restaurant
meals sold with toys or other youth-focused incentive items.40 The
incentive ordinance and the portion rule represent the cutting edge of the
public health law toolkit. Both are best understood as “configuration
bans”41—the portion rule permits retailers to sell and consumers to buy as
much soda as they like, but not in a single extra-large container; the
incentive ordinance permits retailers to sell and parents to buy soda,
cheeseburgers, fries, and a toy designed to appeal to very young kids, but
not configured into a single package. Just as the portion rule sends a
strong signal that sixteen ounces is the “normal” portion for sugary drinks,
the incentive ordinance signals that fruit and low-fat milk—rather than
fries and soda—are the “normal” accompaniments for a young child’s
meal.42

39
See, e.g., Mary MacVean, New York Soda Ban Won’t Work, Marketing Experts Say, L.A.
TIMES (June 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/04/news/la-heb-soda-ban-20120602
(explaining that, according to Professor David Just, some will comply with the letter of the soda ban, if
not the spirit, by simply “drink[ing] three sodas”).
40
S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, §§ 471.1–471.9 (2014); SANTA CLARA, CAL., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. A, div. 18, §§ 350–355 (2014).
41
The use of the term “ban” is perhaps problematic, given how politically charged it is and how
useful critics of the “Big Gulp Ban” and “Happy Meal Ban” have found it to be. “Configuration” is a
somewhat cumbersome term, but I have not yet landed on a more ear-pleasing alternative for this
category.
42
See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (discussing the normalization of balanced
eating). Other examples might be found outside of healthy food regulation. For example, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission prohibits the sale of lawn darts with metal tips. Ban of
Hazardous Lawn Darts, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1306.1–1306.5 (2013). Commentators point out that lawn darts
and metal tips may still be purchased separately and assembled for use by lawn dart enthusiasts who
prefer metal-tipped darts. See Lawn Darts Are Back, Ready to Party Like Its 1980!, COOLTHINGS.COM
(Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.coolthings.com/lawn-darts-are-back-ready-to-party-like-its-1980-again/.
But that criticism overlooks the normative power of the ban. When lawn darts are sold configured with
metal tips, the result is a strong signal to consumers that metal-tipped lawn darts are safe and
appropriate for recreational use. Indeed, many product safety regulations are easily circumvented by
consumers who wish to purchase components separately and do their own configuration. By
prohibiting the sale of products configured in a certain way, the bans still effectively protect consumers
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V. CONCLUSION
Law is a reinforcing expression of social norms. Communities across
the country are converging on the idea that unhealthy consumption patterns
promoted by profit-seeking manufacturers and retailers are burdening the
public’s health and quality of life. A wide range of strategies are being
developed. Denormalization of unhealthy products, portions, and meal
configurations and re-normalization of healthier alternatives are
particularly promising avenues, but these strategies demand innovative law
and policy tools and pioneering state and local governments willing to pilot
their use.
The initial version of the incentive ordinance adopted by San Francisco
and Santa Clara—and the social signal it was designed to send—were
easily circumvented by retailers who simply added a separate, nominal
charge to the customer’s bill for the toy while continuing to market
unbalanced meals to young children.43 It may be that the portion rule in its
current form could be similarly short-circuited. The incentive ordinance’s
designers, however, are back at the drawing board, equipped with new
information about retailers’ responses. The portion rule idea could benefit
from similar experimentation and evolution over time.
The impact on social norms of measures like the portion cap rule, the
incentive ordinance, and other regulations for kids’ meals that are in the
works will take time to evolve. They will require supporting educational
strategies and interventions to ensure the accessibility of healthier
alternatives.
The impact of a regulation on social norms about
consumption is virtually impossible to assess before widespread adoption
by a major city like New York. Friedman focuses on the likely
ineffectiveness of visible hard paternalism. But the problem is that unless
a city like New York adopts and implements such measures, we will not
have the opportunity to find out how well they work. Already, the
proposed portion rule has done a great deal to raise awareness of the harms
associated with overconsumption of sugary drinks. The controversy
surrounding the rule led to an immeasurable amount of free air time to
supplement the social marketing and education campaigns that pre-dated it.
Imagine what it might do—and what we might learn—if it is actually
implemented.

who rely on the fact that a product sold by reputable retailers in a country with considerable product
safety regulation is likely to be safe.
43
See Stephanie Strom, Toys Stay in San Francisco Happy Meals, for a Charge, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/business/toys-to-cost-extra-in-san-franciscohappy-meals.html (detailing how McDonald’s was able to avoid San Francisco’s incentive ban on free
toys “by [charging] an extra 10 cents” for the toys).

